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I.

INTRODUCTION

1. Sareta Ashraph, Stephanie Barbour, Kirsten Campbell, Alexandra Lily Kather,
Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Maxine Marcus, Gorana Mlinarević, Valerie
Oosterveld, Kathleen Roberts, Susana SáCouto, Jelia Sané and Hyunah Yang
(“amici”) respectfully submit observations 1 on the legal interpretation of sexual
slavery and on the permissibility or otherwise of entering cumulative convictions.

II.

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

2. Sexual slavery is not a “form” of enslavement; rather, all acts of a sexual nature,
including control over sexuality, sexual integrity and sexual and reproductive
autonomy, constitute indicia of the exercise of powers of ownership of enslavement
in all its forms. Consequently, enslavement as a crime against humanity is not “in
the abstract entirely encompassed within sexual slavery.” 2 To avoid entering
cumulative convictions for separately enumerated crimes that do not each have a
distinct element from the other, and to avoid a continuation of a discriminatory
application of the law, amici suggest that, in the interests of justice, the Appeals
Chamber reverse the Ongwen Trial Judgment on this point and enter convictions
for enslavement rather than sexual slavery under crimes against humanity because
conduct criminalised under sexual slavery constitutes criminal conduct already
covered by enslavement. Amici believe that this would not be detrimental to
Dominic Ongwen.

The views expressed herein are those of individual amici and do not necessarily reflect the views of
their respective institutions. Amici are grateful to Magali Maystre and Indira Rosenthal for their
comments and suggestions and to Hayley Bronner and Sydney Osterweil-Artson of the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law’s Benjamin B. Ferencz Human Rights and Atrocity Prevention Clinic for their
research assistance.
2 Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 3051.
1
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III.

OBSERVATIONS
A.

Legal interpretation of sexual slavery and enslavement
i.

The 1926 Slavery Convention defines slavery under international
law and contemplates conduct characterised as “sexual slavery”

3. Article 1(1) of the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (“1926
Slavery Convention”) defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”
The 1926 Slavery Convention’s travaux préparatoires, 3 including the Temporary
Slavery Commission Reports, contemplate acts of a sexual nature and control of
sexuality in all forms of slavery. 4 Thus, amici offer that the slavery definition in the
1926 Slavery Convention encompasses the exercise of powers of ownership based
upon control over enslaved persons, including control over their sexuality.
4. Amici submit that the 1926 Slavery Convention intended to include in its definition
inter alia: systems of concubinage, plaçage and the grooming of “fancy girls”; as
well as acts of rape, castration, forced procreation and forced breastfeeding,
whenever these practices evinced the exercise of powers of ownership. 5 The UN
Special Rapporteur on the issue of systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like

See Jean Allain, The Slavery Conventions: The Travaux Préparatoires of the 1926 League of Nations
Convention and the 1956 United Nations Convention.
4 League of Nations, Slavery Convention: Report presented to the Assembly by the Sixth Committee,
A.104.1926.VI, 24 Sept. 1926; League of Nations, Report of the Temporary Slavery Commission, Geneva,
25 July 1925, p. 100 (“[T]he duty of the Commission [... is] to make suggestions with a view to [slavery’s]
entire suppression in all its forms.”) (emphasis added); League of Nations, Slavery Convention: Minutes of
the Second Session Held at Geneva from July 13th to 25th, 1925, p. 62 (discussing systems of slavery, such as
concubinage, that include acts of a sexual nature as slavery, not sexual slavery). In the travaux
préparatoires, slavery “in all its forms” means slavery under law, or de jure (i.e. chattel) slavery, as well
as sanctioned by social customs, or de facto (i.e. domestic) slavery. It also has been used to denote slavery
institutions, systems and practices (i.e. concubinage), but does not refer to indicia or evidence of exercise
of powers of ownership (i.e. control over sexuality, acts of a sexual nature, or “sexual slavery”) as these
factors manifest in slavery in many if not all its forms, even in systems associated with forced labour or
chattel slavery. See Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, ‘“Sexualized Slavery” and
Customary International Law’, in Sharon Weill et al. (eds.), The President on Trial: Prosecuting Hissène
Habré, pp. 366-367 (hereafter Sellers & Kestenbaum, ‘“Sexualized Slavery” and Customary International
Law’).
5 See notes 8-16, infra, and accompanying text.
3
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practices in armed conflict has recognised that “‘sexual’ is […] not to denote a
separate crime. In all respects and in all circumstances, sexual slavery is slavery.” 6
Amici offer that the legal understanding of the 1926 Slavery Convention’s slavery
definition—replicated in the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention 7 and in the
Rome Statute (“Statute”) under enslavement as a crime against humanity—has
always encompassed acts of a sexual nature and control over sexuality.
ii.

Acts of a sexual nature, including control over sexuality, sexual
integrity and sexual and reproductive autonomy, are inherent in all
enslavement institutions, systems and practices

5. Acts of a sexual nature, including control over sexuality, always have been and
continue to be integral to slavery.8 The international slavery prohibition responded
to Trans-Atlantic and East African Slave Trades, de jure chattel slavery institutions
that inherently included complete proprietorship, including complete sexual
proprietorship, over enslaved bodies. 9 Slave owners committed acts of a sexual

Gay J. McDougall, ‘Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and
Slavery-like Practices during Wartime’, Final report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (“McDougall
Report”), para. 30; see also Kunarac et al. Trial Judgment, para. 543 (listing “control of sexuality” in
determining whether enslavement has been committed). While Jean Allain considers “sexual” to be an
adjective to describe a form or type of enslavement, Sellers and Kestenbaum disagree, finding that
sexual slavery, or, rather, sexual violence, including attacks on sexual integrity and reproductive
autonomy, is indicia of exercise of ownership, or the actus reus, of enslavement (defined as slavery) in
all its forms. Sellers & Kestenbaum, ‘“Sexualized Slavery” and Customary International Law’, p. 366, n.6.
7 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, 7 Sept. 1956 (“1956 Slavery Convention”), Art. 7(a); U.N. Secretary General, ‘Slavery,
the Slave Trade, and Other Forms of Servitude’, U.N. Doc. E/2357, 27 Jan. 1953, paras 36-37.
8 See Orlando Patterson, Freedom in the Making of Western Culture, pp. 50-51 (noting that circa 700 B.C.E.,
the Greek city-states would capture enemy females in order to replenish the slave population that was
overwhelmingly female); Orlando Paterson, ‘Trafficking, Gender & Slavery: Past and Present’, in Jean
Allain (ed.), The Legal Understanding of Slavery: From the Historical to the Contemporary (1st ed). In this
brief, “slavery” denotes the prohibition and crime under established frameworks of international law,
i.e. “applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law” ( Statute, Art. 21(1)(b)), and
includes both “enslavement” as a crime against humanity (Statute, Art. 7(1)(c)) and “sexual slavery” as
a crime against humanity and a war crime (Statute, Arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi)) (sexual
slavery includes an additional element of “causing a person to engage in an act or acts of a sexual
nature.”). “Slavery crimes” includes all aforementioned crimes plus the “slave trade” under established
frameworks of international law.
9 League of Nations, Temporary Slavery Commission 1925 Report, p. 87 (At the Temporary Slavery
Commission’s 17th Meeting, M. Roncagli interrogated: “Was it also certain, as had been said, that the
only object of slavery in Africa was to obtain labour? It enslaved the whole material and moral life of
6
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nature against enslaved persons of varied races, ages and genders in myriad ways,
including rape, castrations and other genital mutilation, separation of spouses, and
forced coupling and procreation. 10 Slaveholders impregnated, raped, sexually
mutilated, ordered sexual assaults, conducted sexual medical experiments and
forced enslaved lactating women referred to as “wet nurses” to breastfeed white
infants. 11 Enslaved men, boys, gender nonconforming and nonbinary persons also
endured sexual violence that has been obscured by a narrow, binary gendered
lens. 12 Individuals were enslaved as concubines, “fancy girls,” pleasure objects,
bardaj (sexual “kept boy” slaves) or harem eunuchs. 13 Berdaches (Native American

the individual. It could not therefore be concluded that at the present time slavery only existed for the
purpose of obtaining labour.”). See also Daina Ramey Berry, The Price for Their Pound of Flesh: The Value
of the Enslaved, from Womb to Grave, in the Building of a Nation, p. 3 (hereafter Ramey Berry, The Price for
Their Pound of Flesh).
10 See Peter Kolchin, American Slavery: 1619–1877, pp. 124-125; Patricia Viseur Sellers, ‘Wartime Female
Slavery: Enslavement?’, 44 Cornell Int’l L.J. 115, pp. 122-123; Donna Wyant Howell, I Was a Slave: True
Life Stories Dictated by Former Slaves in the 1930’s, Book Four: The Breeding of Slaves, pp. 11-12; Dorothy
Roberts, Killing the Black Body, pp. 27-28; Jessica Millward, ‘Wombs of Liberation: Petition, Law and the
Black Woman’s Body in Maryland, 1780–1858’, in Daina Ramey Berry & Leslie Harris (eds.), Sexuality
and Slavery, pp. 88-98. Slaveholders “bred” children born as slaves through their sexual ownership over
enslaved persons. See Ramey Berry, The Price for Their Pound of Flesh, pp. 72-73. Slave auctions, for
example, would advertise and sell enslaved persons referred to as “breeders” (“breeding wenches” or
“bucks”) based on perceived or real abilities to reproduce and bear children born into slavery to
replenish the slave population and increase slaveowners’ wealth and power. See Thomas A. Foster, ‘The
Sexual Abuse of Black Men Under American Slavery’, 20 J. Hist. Sexuality 445, pp. 449, 451-458.
11 See, e.g., Daina Ramey Berry, Swing the Sickle for the Harvest is Ripe: Gender and Slavery in Antebellum
Georgia, p. 37; Harriet A. Washington, Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation from
Colonial Times to the Present, pp. 64-68, 117-119; Dierdre Cooper Owens, Medical Bondage: Race, Gender,
and the Origins of American Gynecology, pp. 17, 26; Daina Ramey Berry, The Price for Their Pound of Flesh,
pp. 3, 72-73, 149-155; Stephanie Jones-Rogers, ‘“[S]he could … spare one ample breast for the profit of
her owner”: white mothers and enslaved wet nurses’ invisible labor in American slave markets’, 38
Slavery & Abolition 337, p. 338.
12 For example, enslaved persons considered to be diminutive or ‘runty’ might be castrated to prevent
the propagation of weak-bodied slaves. See Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body, p. 28. See also
Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, ‘The International Crimes of Slavery and the Slave
Trade: A Feminist Critique’, in Valerie Oosterveld et al. (eds.), Gender and International Criminal Law,
p. 25 (hereafter Sellers & Kestenbaum, ‘The International Crimes of Slavery and the Slave Trade: A
Feminist Critique’).
13 Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem, p. 89; Ehud R.
Toledano, ‘The Imperial Eunuchs of Istanbul: From Africa to the Heart of Islam’, 20 Middle Eastern Stud.
379, pp. 379-380 (hereafter Toledano, ‘The Imperial Eunuchs of Istanbul: From Africa to the Heart of
Islam’) (Enslavement of concubines constituted “harem-slavery.” Gendered and sexualised, haremslavery included females across racial lines. Ottoman Empire Ethiopian and European girls or young
women were enslaved in middle-class harems as concubines. Females from the Caucasus were sold by
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“two-spirit” individuals) were captured in war, enslaved, raped and emasculated. 14
6. Enslavement today resembles past institutions, systems and practices of slavery.
Enslaved individuals, including children, have constituted and continue to
constitute sexual war booty in conflict. 15 Since 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant has engaged in enslavement of persons of religious minorities,
including Yazidi, of all genders and ages, which has encompassed acts of a sexual
nature, including control over sexuality, sexual integrity and sexual and
reproductive autonomy. 16
7. Thus, amici submit that acts of a sexual nature, including control over sexuality,
sexual integrity and sexual and reproductive autonomy, always have been and
continue to be inherent in all enslavement institutions, systems and practices.
iii.

Acts of a sexual nature, including control over sexuality, sexual
integrity and sexual and reproductive autonomy, constitute indicia
of exercise of ownership powers of enslavement as a crime against
humanity

8. Amici suggest that the slavery definition under the 1926 Slavery Convention is the
basis for the correct legal interpretation of enslavement under the Statute.
Accordingly, causing enslaved persons to engage in sexual acts or restraining
enslaved persons from engaging in sexual acts (i.e. control over sexuality, sexual
integrity and sexual and reproductive autonomy) owing to their enslaved status or

their families hoping that they would enter the Imperial or upper-class harems.); Tiye A. Gordon, The
Fancy Trade and the Commodification of Rape in the Sexual Economy of 19th Century U.S. Slavery; Orlando
Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, p. 177 (Adolescents of all genders have been sexual slaves throughout
history, including young boys in Greek slavery.); Will Roscoe, The Zuni Man-Woman, pp. 5, 22, 28, 144;
Alastair Hazell, The Last Slave Market, p. 19.
14 Thomas A. Foster, ‘The Sexual Abuse of Black Men Under American Slavery’, 20 J. Hist. Sexuality,
pp. 445-447.
15 See Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, pp. 106-115; Ehud R. Toledano, ‘The Imperial Eunuchs
of Istanbul: From Africa to the Heart of Islam’, p. 379; Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, ‘Disaggregating
Slavery and the Slave Trade’, 16 Fl. Int’l U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022), p. 3.
16 See U.N. Human Rights Council, ‘“They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/32/CRP.2, 15 June 2016, paras 55, 75; Mara Redlich Revkin & Elisabeth Jean Wood, ‘The Islamic
State’s Pattern of Sexual Violence: Ideology and Institutions, Policies and Practices’, J. Global Security
Studies, pp. 1-20.
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condition fall within the definition.
9. In Kunarac et al., the ICTY clarified that control of sexuality is a factor or indication
to determine whether enslavement occurred, but does not constitute per se an
element of enslavement under international law. 17 While “acts of a sexual nature”
are inherent in—or at times the raison d’être of—enslavement, misconceptions of
slavery decouple forced labour from sexual violence and control that all enslaved
persons must endure. 18 Such decoupling fails to comprehend the nature of
enslavement: that sexual violence and control of sexuality are effective manners in
which all perpetrators exercise powers of ownership in all slavery practices over
all enslaved persons. 19
10. Amici submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber correctly identified control of
sexuality as an indicator of the exercise of powers of ownership of enslavement. 20
The Ongwen Trial Chamber emphasised systematic practices in which persons of
all genders and ages were enslaved, evinced by inter alia abductions and forced
labour. 21 Moreover, it found that Dominic Ongwen directly and indirectly
perpetrated acts of a sexual nature in the context of enslavement. 22
11. Amici submit, however, that the Ongwen Trial Chamber’s evidentiary and
subsequent legal analysis of acts of a sexual nature and control of sexuality in the
context of enslavement failed to recognise the sexualized ownership exercised over
victims, in particular child-victims, 23 which occurred whether or not they were
caused to engage in any act of a sexual nature. It therefore hindered a more accurate
Kunarac et al. Trial Judgment, paras 540, 542-543 (affirmed on appeal in Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgment,
paras 119, 124). See also Duch Trial Judgment, paras 342-346 (exercise of sexual control is part of
established international crime of enslavement) (affirmed on appeal in Duch Appeal Judgment, paras
119-167).
18 Sellers & Kestenbaum, ‘The International Crimes of Slavery and the Slave Trade: A Feminist Critique’,
pp. 49-55.
19 Sellers & Kestenbaum, ‘“Sexualized Slavery” and Customary International Law’, pp. 374-379.
20 Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 2712.
21 Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 2803-2805, 2894-2896, 2948, 3083, 3087.
22 Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 3044-3049, 3081-3084.
23 Not recognising control of sexuality as indicia of exercise of ownership powers over girl-child ting
tings occurring without an additional act of sexual nature constitutes gender and age discrimination in
the application and interpretation of the law in violation of Article 21(3) of the Statute.
17
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and comprehensive legal interpretation of enslavement, excluding myriad
additional acts, even acts of a sexual nature, constituting indicia of enslavement.
Amici offer that acts of a sexual nature (the conduct legally characterised as forced
marriage as an other inhumane act, (sexualised) torture, rape and forced
pregnancy) committed against abducted individuals also are indicia of
enslavement. 24 Further, amici submit that children born to enslaved persons are
enslaved. 25
12. Thus, amici submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber erred in the legal
characterisation of criminal conduct of sexual slavery as a more “specific form” of
enslavement and in finding that enslavement “is in the abstract entirely
encompassed within sexual slavery.” 26 All acts of a sexual nature, including control
of sexuality, are indicia of the exercise of powers of ownership of enslavement.
iv.

As

a

separate

crime,

sexual

slavery

has

been

applied

discriminatorily, excluding categories of harms and victims, and
resulting in adverse distinctions based on gender and age
13. Some international criminal law instruments have enumerated “sexual slavery” as
a separate crime from enslavement 27 due to misconceptions of slavery.28 Advocates
at Rome supported enumerating “sexual slavery” because the international
community failed to hold perpetrators to account for sexual violence committed in
the context of slavery. 29
Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 3021-3043, 3056-3062.
Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 207, 2068-2069, 3057.
26 Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 3051.
27 Statute, Arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi); SCSL Statute, Art. 2(g).
28 See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, ‘Women and International Humanitarian Law’, in Kelly D. Askin & Dorean
M. Koenig (eds.), Women and Int’l Hum. Rts. L. 41, p. 48, n.29 (highlighting the way some advocates
during the time of the Statute drafting assumed that sexual acts were not already included under
enslavement and confusing sexual slavery with, for example, “(en)forced prostitution”). The ICTY
explained sexual slavery’s absence in its Statute: “The setting out of the violations in separate subparagraphs of the ICC Statute is not to be interpreted as meaning, for example, that sexual slavery is not
[...] enslavement. This separation is to be explained by the fact that the sexual violence violations were
considered best to be grouped together.” See Kunarac et al. Trial Judgment, para. 541, n. 1333.
29 E.g., so-called “comfort women” of World War II. See Valerie Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Slavery and the
International Criminal Court: Advancing International Law’, 25 Mich. Int’l L.J., p. 625 (“The arguments
in favour of retaining the separate listings of the crimes of enslavement and sexual slavery—that sexual
24
25
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14. In this context, “sexual slavery” has been used to legally characterise
heteronormative male-on-female rapes, 30 omitting myriad other sexual violence
acts and exercise of control over sexuality that also are indicia of enslavement. The
consequent effect is discrimination against categories of victims based on, inter alia,
gender and age.31 Amici submit that sexual slavery’s separate enumeration was
never intended to exclude categories of enslavement victims or certain conduct in
violation of the principle of non-discrimination.
15. The ICC Elements of Crimes distinguish “sexual slavery” from “enslavement” by
requiring additional proof that the perpetrator caused the victim to engage in an
act of a sexual nature. 32 Although ICC trial chambers in Katanga and Ntaganda found
that the decisive factor for sexual slavery is the exercise of ownership powers over
a person’s sexual autonomy 33 and that “there is no exhaustive list of situations or
circumstances” that delimit how ownership powers are exercised, 34 they have
limited “acts of a sexual nature” to acts of rape. 35
16. The restrictive approach taken to sexual slavery in the above-mentioned ICC cases
failed to consider victims’ experiences of sexual acts other than heteronormative
male-on-female rapes because they do not resemble rape. In this way, these cases
slavery is a prevalent contemporary crime warranting express recognition, that [it] was sufficiently
established in existing law, that listing the crime increases the gender-sensitivity of the Rome Statute,
and that sexual slavery is conceptually distinct from certain other forms of enslavement or slavery-like
practices—proved persuasive for delegates, and both crimes remained in the [ICC] Statute.”).
30 See Ntaganda Trial Judgment, paras 955, 975 (affirmed on appeal in Ntaganda Appeal Judgment,
paras 856, 1027, 1144). See also Katanga Trial Judgment, paras 990, 1000, 1008, 1011-1013, 1018, 1022
(rapes as the “caused acts”); Ngudjolo Chui Trial Judgment, paras 76, 101, 107 (charges dismissed on
other grounds); Duch Trial Judgment, para. 362; Taylor Trial Judgment, paras 422, 426-427; Sesay et al.
Trial Judgment, paras 1293-1294.
31 Ntaganda Trial Judgment, paras 955-957, 959-961, 977-980; Katanga Trial Judgment, paras 1000-1019
(recounting evidence of “acts” as repeated rapes); Taylor Appeal Judgment, paras 264-277, 289, 297
(artificially separating the use of females as sexual (conjugal) and domestic slaves for “housework”).
32 Compare ICC Elements of Crimes of Article 7(1)(c)-2 of the Statute with Articles 7(1)(g)-2, 8(2)(b)(xxii)2 and 8(2)(e)(vi)-2 of the Statute.
33 See Ntaganda Trial Judgment, paras 960, 1204; Katanga Trial Judgment, paras 975, 981, 1013.
34 Ntaganda Trial Judgment, para. 952.
35 See Ntaganda Trial Judgment, paras 955, 975 (affirmed on appeal in Ntaganda Appeal Judgment,
paras 856, 1027, 1144). See also rapes as the “caused acts” in Katanga Trial Judgment, paras 1008, 10111013, 1018, 1022; and in Ngudjolo Chui Trial Judgment, paras 76, 101, 107 (charges dismissed on other
grounds).
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also failed to address the consequent multiple physical and psychological harms
created by the acts of a sexual nature, including loss of control of sexuality, attacks
on sexual integrity and denial of sexual and reproductive autonomy. 36 Amici offer
that, under Article 7 of the Statute, these indicia constitute exercise of ownership
powers for both enslavement and sexual slavery.
17. Amici submit that enumerating sexual slavery and enslavement separates out some
acts from the broader category of enslavement, leading to the erroneous
interpretation that enslavement “is […] entirely encompassed within sexual
slavery” 37 when allegations include acts of a sexual nature. 38 Amici offer that, in
accordance with the established framework of international law, the conduct
criminalised by the Statute under “sexual slavery” constitutes criminal conduct
already covered by the crime of enslavement. 39 In other words, when sexual
autonomy and sexual integrity are subjugated to ownership, enslavement exists. 40
18. Amici further offer that, in the Ongwen case as well, sexual slavery as a separate
crime has been applied restrictively, leading to a discriminatory result. According
to the facts, Dominic Ongwen directly or indirectly perpetrated acts of a sexual
nature and control of sexuality against all enslaved persons. For example, enslaved
boy-child soldiers (though solely legally characterised as conscripted) were forced
to rape; the enslaved girl-child ting tings were subjected to the exercise of sexualised

Further, dividing acts into sexual slavery and enslavement engenders a discriminatory application of
sexual slavery by presuming and requiring that the victims are female and perpetrators are male. See
Katanga Trial Judgment, paras 973-978. See also Sellers & Kestenbaum, ‘”Sexualized Slavery” and
Customary International Law’; Alexandra Adams, ‘Sexual Slavery: Do We Need This Crime in Addition
to Enslavement? ’, 29 Crim. L. Forum 279-323, p. 282.
37 Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 3051.
38 Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 2715-2716 (analysis of the applicable law), 3051 (legal findings that
sexual slavery is a specific form of enslavement).
39 See also Taylor Trial Judgment, para. 427 (The Taylor Trial Chamber opined that sexual slavery,
misconstrued as ‘forced marriage’ “constitutes a form of enslavement in that the perpetrator exercised
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over their ‘bush wives’ and imposed on them a
deprivation of liberty, causing them to engage in sexual acts as well as other acts. [...] All of these forced
acts, both sexual and non-sexual acts, fall within the definition of enslavement”.); Sesay et al. Trial
Judgment, para. 156.
40 See McDougall Report, para. 46. See also International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Study on
Customary International Humanitarian Law’, Practice Related to Rule 94: Slavery and Slave Trade.
36
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ownership, including through forced checking of the onset of menstruation to
determine whether they had reached puberty and were “ready” to be raped and
groomed to become “wives”. 41 Enslaved “wives” were controlled sexually through
inter alia exclusive sexual relationships and in addition were subjected to rape. 42
Enslaved ting tings who later became “wives” were controlled sexually throughout
their enslavement whether or not they additionally were subjected to rape. 43
19. Amici submit that, in these examples, Dominic Ongwen directly or indirectly
exercised powers of ownership and control over these enslaved persons’ sexuality,
sexual integrity and sexual and reproductive autonomy, whether or not they were
subjected to rape. However, the Ongwen Trial Chamber narrowly interpreted
sexual slavery by focusing solely on male-on-female rapes in the context of
abductions and distributions. Further, amici submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber
erroneously interpreted enslavement by excluding consideration of the exercise of
physical and psychological control over enslaved persons’ sexuality as an inherent

Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 2819, 3073 (describing physical and sexual violence to find torture as a
crime against humanity and war crime), 2100, 2146 (collecting young girls free of HIV or other diseases),
2249-2250 (checking for breast development and menstruation), 2251 (“if a girl was still very young, she
was ‘nurtured’, ‘kept to grow until when she’s fit to be given out to a man’ [… deciding] that a girl was
‘old enough to be given to a man as a wife’”.). The girl-child ting tings who were not subjected to rape
or other “act of a sexual nature” were not characterised as sexually enslaved, nor were they
characterised as sexual slaves as war crimes under Article 8. Article 8 provisions are not analogous to
enslavement under Article 7 and, therefore, cannot precisely characterise such criminal conduct.
42 Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 3086. The Statute criminalises enslavement as a crime against humanity
but does not criminalise slavery as a war crime. While the Statute does not include slavery (or the slave
trade) under Article 8, slavery and the slave trade are war crimes. See Lieber Code (1863), Arts. 42, 58;
IMT Charter (Nuremberg) (1945), Art. 6 (“deportation to slave labor”); Allied Control Council Law
No. 10 (1945), Art. II(1) (“deportation to slave labor”); 1977 Additional Protocol II, Art. 4(2)(f) (“slavery
and the slave trade in all their forms” are and shall remain prohibited); International Committee of the
Red Cross, ‘Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’, Practice Related to Rule 94: Slavery
and Slave Trade.
43 Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 2272 (the “prohibition of sexual relations with ting tings” as “the crucial
marker distinguishing the status of ting ting from the status of so-called ‘wife’.”), 3086 (noting that while
“Sinia brigade members regularly forced abducted women and girls who had been ‘distributed’ to them
into sexual intercourse is not limited to so-called ‘wives’, and […] ting ting status did not effectively
protect abducted girls from sexual abuse, the Chamber nevertheless considers that there existed,
systemically, a sub-category of abducted girls in the LRA who were not sexually enslaved, but
enslaved.”).
41
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part of the exercise of ownership over their entire being. 44
20. Amici offer that this incorrectly narrow understanding of both crimes was also
discriminatory on the bases of, inter alia, gender and age. In this way the Ongwen
Trial Chamber reinforced the misconception that enslavement primarily
criminalises the general deprivation of liberty, forced labour or violence
perpetrated against enslaved persons, while the crime of sexual slavery primarily
criminalises rape and rape-like acts in the enslavement of women and girls.
21. Further, requiring some enslaved women and girls to prove additional acts of a
sexual nature indicating the exercise of ownership over them in the form of rapes
constitutes gender discrimination in the law’s interpretation and application in
violation of Article 21(3) of the Statute.
22. Amici submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber did not err in characterising conduct
against enslaved women and girls, including girl-child ting tings, who were not
raped as enslavement. However, amici offer that this correct result was reached for
the wrong reasons; it was not because the victims’ enslavement excluded rape. 45
23. Thus, amici submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber erred in subsuming
enslavement within sexual slavery because the exercise of powers of ownership (i.e.
slavery) is the element to emphasise, not the act of a sexual nature, which is
included as indicia of exercise of ownership powers in all forms of enslavement.
24. Amici submit that distinctions between “sexual slavery” and “enslavement” is
contradictory to established frameworks of international law since acts of a sexual

Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 3047 (act of a sexual nature constituting exclusively male-on-female
rape).
45 Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 3086, 3073. Amici are of the view that, for these women and girls, indicia
of enslavement also include control of sexuality, sexual integrity and sexual and reproductive
autonomy. However, given the way the Prosecution fragmented the material facts and circumstances
into various charges in this case, facts indicating control of sexuality and control over sexual and
reproductive autonomy were charged solely as forced marriage as an other inhumane act and as forced
pregnancy, but not as enslavement. See, e.g., Ongwen Pre-Trial Confirmation of Charges Decision,
paras 75, 79, 84, 88, 93, 102. Amici are further of the view that male victims of enslavement also had their
sexuality, sexual integrity and sexual and reproductive autonomy controlled because, for instance,
enslaved men could not choose to engage in any act of a sexual nature or choose to reproduce. However,
these facts were not charged in this case under enslavement or any other crime.
44
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nature, including control of sexuality, are indicia of enslavement. Furthermore,
amici offer that the mischaracterisation and application of these two crimes has
resulted in discrimination in contravention of Article 21(3) of the Statute.
B.

Cumulative convictions

25. In general, cumulative convictions serve the fundamental purpose of fully
reflecting the culpability of an accused. 46 Victims and affected communities of
“atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity” 47 have an interest in a full
accounting of a convicted person’s criminality, not only through making factual
findings, but also through entering appropriate convictions that capture the full
scope of criminal conduct.
26. First, amici submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber did not err, as the Defence
contends, 48 in rejecting the relevance of Article 20 of the Statute to cumulative
convictions. 49 Article 20 of the Statute deals with the principle of ne bis in idem,
namely the prohibition of consecutive trials for conduct which formed the basis of
crimes for which a person has already been convicted or acquitted, whereas the
permissibility or otherwise of entering cumulative convictions is an issue that
arises within a single trial. 50 Moreover, the Ongwen Trial Chamber correctly noted
that nothing in the Statute excludes the permissibility of entering cumulative
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 169 (“multiple convictions serve to describe the full culpability
of a particular accused or provide a complete picture of his criminal conduct”); Duch Appeal Judgment,
para. 330, referring to Duch Trial Judgment, para. 560 (“While, however, cumulative convictions will
not substantially impinge on the Accused’s rights a failure to convict the Accused cumulatively
undermines the societal interests in describing ‘the full culpability of a particular accused or provid[ing]
a complete picture of his criminal conduct’”). This seems particularly important in proceedings, like the
ones at the ICC, which allow victims participation.
47 Statute, Preamble, para. 2.
48 Ongwen Defence Appeal Brief, paras 277-282 (ground 20 of the appeal).
49 Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 2794-2795.
50 See also Bemba et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 748. Moreover, “attempts to import conclusions from the
realm of the concursus delictorum practices in some domestic jurisdictions–where […] there are clearer
distinctions both in terms of the interplay between different elements and the gravity between offences–
can be misleading. [… W]hatever domestic legislatures, courts, and scholars may have decided as to the
interplay between the elements of crimes contained in their criminal codes can be irrelevant vis-à-vis
international crimes, where different rules and principles apply.” See Göran Sluiter, Håkan Friman,
Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev & Salvatore Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure, p. 452.
46
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convictions. 51
27. Second, amici further submit that entering cumulative convictions is permissible
under certain conditions and that the correct test for establishing its permissibility
has been set out and consistently applied by the appeals chambers of the ad hoc
tribunals, 52 the SCSL53 and the ECCC. 54 The established test, articulated by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in Čelebići, states that “reasons of fairness to the accused and the
consideration that only distinct crimes may justify multiple convictions, lead to the
conclusion that multiple criminal convictions entered under different statutory
provisions but based on the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory
provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other. An
element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required
by the other.” 55 Further, “[w]here this test is not met, […] the conviction under the
more specific provision should be upheld.” 56 This test has been applied by ICC trial
chambers 57 and endorsed by the ICC Appeals Chamber. 58

Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 2792. This issue is unaddressed in the Statute, the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, and Regulations of the ICC but paragraph 9 of the “General introduction” to the Elements
of the Crimes of the ICC states that “[a] particular conduct may constitute one or more crimes.”
52 Čelebići Appeal Judgment, paras 412-427. See also, e.g., Jelisić Appeal Judgment, paras 78-83; Kupreškić
et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 385-388, 393-396; Musema Appeal Judgment, para. 363-370; Kunarac et al.
Appeal Judgment, paras 168-174, 178-186, 188-196; Rutaganda Appeal Judgment, paras 582-584;
Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment, para. 542; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment,
paras 1032-1044; Semanza Appeal Judgment, paras 368-370; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgment,
paras 589-591; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 425-427; Stakić Appeal Judgment, paras 355-367;
Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 1019-1021, 1025-1027, 1029-1030, 1032, 1034-1036; Strugar
Appeal Judgment, paras 321-333; Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, paras 386-391; Milošević Appeal Judgment,
para. 39; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgment, paras 413-417, 735-737; Ntabakuze Appeal
Judgment, paras 260-262; Gatete Appeal Judgment, paras 259-264; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal
Judgment, paras 610, 710-713; Popović et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 537-538; Tolimir Appeal Judgment,
paras 601-602, 605-606, 610, 614-617, 621-622.
53 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 202; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, paras 220-226; Sesay et
al. Appeal Judgment, paras 1190-1194, 1197-1200; Taylor Appeal Judgment, paras 577-578.
54 Duch Appeal Judgment, paras 285-336.
55 Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 412.
56 Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 413.
57 See, e.g., Katanga Trial Judgment, para. 1695; Bemba Trial Judgment, paras 745-751; Ntaganda Appeal
Judgment, paras 1202-1206.
58 Ntaganda Sentencing Appeal Judgment, paras 131-132; Bemba et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 750. In the
Bemba et al. case, the ICC Appeals Chamber found no error in the trial chamber’s reliance on the Čelebići
test for cumulative convictions in “a situation where one offence falls entirely within the ambit of
51
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28. Third, amici offer that the Ongwen Trial Chamber did not err in applying the Čelebići
test with respect to cumulative convictions for the same crime enumerated both as
a crime against humanity and as a war crime, as well as with respect to rape and
sexual slavery as war crimes and crimes against humanity. 59 Applying the test to
find that sexual slavery subsumed enslavement as crimes against humanity,
however, exacerbates the discriminatory interpretation and application of the law,
and results in adverse distinctions in violation of Article 21(3) of the Statute for the
reasons explained in Part A, supra. 60 As a result, amici submit that the Ongwen Trial
Chamber’s correct application of the test produced a discriminatory outcome.
29. Sexual slavery is a more specific offence than enslavement, in that it requires proof
that the “[t]he perpetrator caused [the] person or persons to engage in one or more
acts of a sexual nature.” However, for the reasons explained in Part A, supra, amici
submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber’s entering of convictions for this conduct as
sexual slavery rather than enslavement as a crime against humanity is the result of
its mischaracterisation of the criminal conduct under the wrong crime. 61
Consequently, amici submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber’s correct application of
the test also produced an illogical outcome.
30. Accordingly, amici submit that there are cogent reasons in the interests of justice to
depart from the applicability of the Čelebići test only with respect to enslavement
and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity. 62
another, and therefore on a conviction for the more specific crime is ultimately entered.” See also Bemba
et al. Trial Judgment, paras 950-952, 955. However, the ICC Appeals Chamber did “not dwell on” other
situations where cumulative convictions are permitted. See Bemba et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 751.
59 Cumulative convictions were entered for the analogous crimes against humanity and war crimes of
sexual slavery, murder, torture, rape, and forced pregnancy. See Ongwen Trial Judgment, paras 2874,
2927, 2973, 3062, 3080, 3100. However, the amici agree with the Prosecutor that the Ongwen Trial
Chamber departed from the consistent practice by going beyond the strict application of the Čelebići test
in one instance but with no impact on its decision. See Ongwen Prosecution Response to Defence Appeal
Brief, para. 138, referring to Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 2796.
60 See paras 13-14, 24, supra.
61 See paras 11-12, 19, 22, supra. For example, factual findings concerning ting tings who became “wives”
led solely to a conviction for sexual slavery but not enslavement, whereas factual findings regarding
ting tings who were not raped, led solely to a conviction for enslavement.
62 Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, paras 108-111 (“Instances of situations where cogent reasons in the
interests of justice require a departure from a previous decision include cases where the previous
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31. Considering the above, the amici submit that the Ongwen Trial Chamber should
have entered a conviction for enslavement, rather than sexual slavery, as a crime
against humanity. Amici therefore suggest that, in the interests of justice, the
Appeals Chamber reverse the Ongwen Trial Judgment on this point and enter
convictions for enslavement rather than sexual slavery because conduct
criminalised under sexual slavery constitutes criminal conduct already covered by
enslavement. Amici believe that this would not be detrimental to Dominic Ongwen.

IV.

CONCLUSION

32. For the above reasons, amici respectfully suggest that the Appeals Chamber:
(1) recognise that acts of a sexual nature, including control over sexuality, sexual
integrity and sexual and reproductive autonomy, are indicia of enslavement in all
its forms; and (2) in the interests of justice, reverse the Ongwen Trial Judgment on
cumulative convictions only with respect to sexual slavery and enslavement as
crimes against humanity and enter convictions for enslavement rather than sexual
slavery.

Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Associate Professor of Clinical Law,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
on behalf of the abovementioned named amici
Dated this 23rd day of December 2021
At The Hague, The Netherlands

decision has been decided on the basis of a wrong legal principle or cases where a previous decision has
been given per incuriam, that is a judicial decision that has been ‘wrongly decided, usually because the
judge or judges were ill-informed about the applicable law.’ […] The Appeals Chamber will only depart
from a previous decision after the most careful consideration has been given to it, both as to the law,
including the authorities cited, and the facts. […] Where, in a case before it, the Appeals Chamber is
faced with previous decisions that are conflicting, it is obliged to determine which decision it will follow,
or whether to depart from both decisions for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.”).
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